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Abstract: In a seminal experiment, Doob and Gross (1968) examined the influence of social 
status on peer-punishment of norm violations in traffic. They observed an inverse relationship 
between the economic status indicated by a car that was blocking an intersection and the 
punishment meted out to the driver of that car, with “punishment” taking the form of a honk of 
the car horn. In a more recent experiment, Diekmann et al. (1996) noted the status and reactions 
of the cars blocked by a single mid-status car. Blocked drivers at the wheel of a higher-status car 
were found to punish more aggressively than drivers of a lower-status car. Our study employs a 
combined design to separate the effects of driver and blocker status. In two field experiments, 
we varied the status of the norm-violating car and recorded the status of the blocked driver’s 
(i.e. the experimental subject’s) car. Our results provide evidence that social distance facilitates 
peer-punishment. Punishment was expressed less readily when the blocked and blocking cars 
indicated a similar social status. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Various studies have examined the relationship between socioeconomic status and the peer-
sanctioning of norm violations (such as unnecessarily blocking the way) in road traffic. Most of 
these have focused on the effect of the status of only one of the parties, either that of the norm 
violator or that of the punisher. In a seminal study examining the effect of the norm violator’s 
status, Doob and Gross (1968) measured horn-honking response times as an indicator of drivers’ 
aggression in response to being blocked by an experimental car at traffic lights in the United 
States. Two different blocking cars were used, each indicating a different social status. As 
response times were significantly shorter, and responses occurred significantly more frequently, 
when a driver was frustrated (i.e. blocked) by an automobile indicating lower status, Doob and 
Gross concluded that the presumable social status of the blocking driver and aggression 
expressed toward that blocking driver are inversely related. Deaux (1971) found a similar yet 
non-significant effect in one roughly contemporaneous replication of the experiment in the U.S., 
but Chase and Mills (1973) found the opposite effect in another such replication. The effect 
reported by Doob and Gross was, however, recently replicated in a Japanese study that found 
longer honking latencies in response to being blocked by a high-status car than a low-status car, 
as long as the car did not display a beginning driver’s plate (Yazawa 2004). Finally, drivers in a 
study by McGarva and Steiner (2000) responded more aggressively to provocation from a low-
status driver than from a high-status driver.  
 
Other studies have instead looked at the effect of the blocked driver’s status on a honking 
response. For example, Diekmann et al. (1996) also blocked drivers at traffic lights (in 
Germany) and recorded horn-honking response times, but held the status of the blocking car 
constant while measuring the status indicated by the blocked car (containing the potential 
punisher). Diekmann et al. found a positive relationship between the status of the driver and the 
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degree of aggression he or she displayed toward the driver of the blocking car (with the 
exception of the lowest class drivers, who acted fairly aggressively as well). 
 
Results from such horn-honking studies are traditionally discussed in the context of theories of 
aggressive behavior. The idea is that being blocked causes frustration and anger on the side of 
the blocked driver (Baron 1976; Lajunen & Parker 2001; Lajunen, Parker, & Stradling 1998; 
Lawton & Nutter 2002), who may then react with responses such as horn honking, obscene 
gestures, flashing high beams, or tailgating (Hennessy & Wiesenthal 1997; Parker, Lajunen, & 
Summala 2002; Turner, Layton, & Simons 1975). Whether such behavior is shown depends on 
both the aggressor’s traits and the situation in which the aggression occurs (for a corresponding 
general aggression model, see Anderson and Bushman 2002; for a similar model applying 
specifically to driver behavior, see Shinar 1998). A distinction is also made between hostile 
aggression as an impulsive response intended to harm a victim, and instrumental aggression, 
which is a premeditated action used as a means to achieve some goal other than harming a 
victim (Anderson and Bushman 2002:29). Although drivers who engage in horn honking are 
also likely to engage in other forms of mild aggression (Novaco 1991; Shinar 1998) and horn-
honking behavior varies according to factors that have been observed to promote aggressive 
responses in general (such as uncomfortably hot temperatures, stressful circumstances, or 
increased anonymity: see Baron 1976; Kenrick & MacFarlane 1986; Hennessy & Wiesenthal 
1999; Ellison, Govern, Petri, & Figler 1995), it seems obvious that honking often has an 
instrumental component, i.e. the attempt to motivate the blocker to move his or her car. 
However, whether honking represents an expression of hostile or of instrumental aggression 
(which can be difficult to separate, as is pointed out by various authors: see Doob & Gross 
1968; McGarva & Steiner 2000; Shinar 1998), there is reason to believe that drivers blocked at 
an intersection by an experimental car will find the experience frustrating and are likely to 
retaliate by honking their own car horns. 
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An explanation for why blocked drivers honk their horn is that the frustrating situation makes 
them angry. Anger has been defined as an attempt to adjust social behavior when someone else 
has violated rules or norms. It is an emotional state that often results in aggressive behavior, and 
may indeed be associated with aggressive behavior while driving (Lawton & Nutter 2002). 
There are, however, differences between people in terms of their disposition toward becoming 
angry, both in general (Pitkänen 1973; Verona, Patrick, & Lang 2002) and in response to 
frustrations on the road (Deffenbacher et al. 2001; Deffenbacher, Oetting, & Lynch 1994; 
McGarva & Steiner 2000; Yagil 2001). Anger is expressed less often than it is experienced, 
both while driving (Lajunen & Parker 2001) and in general (Ramirez, Santisteban, Fujihara, & 
Van Goozen 2002). One factor thought to influence the experience and the expression of anger 
is the social status of the angered person. Various theorists have discussed the role of emotional 
expression and suppression in establishing and maintaining social hierarchies (Clark 1990; 
Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson 2003; Kemper 1978, 1987; Lovaglia & Houser 1996; 
McKinnon 1994; Ridgeway & Johnson 1990; Smith-Lovin 1990), predicting that those who 
occupy higher status positions will experience less negative affect than those of lower status and 
will also express any anger they experience more freely. There is some empirical evidence that 
this is the case. Using broad-based population samples, Haukkala (2002) and Schieman (2003) 
found either no SES-related differences in trait anger (Haukkala) or less anger in higher 
economic classes (Schieman). However, both authors found that anger, when experienced, was 
more likely to be expressed by those with better education or higher income. Other studies have 
found similar effects on the expression of anger in the workplace, with those of higher 
occupational status more likely to express their anger than those of a lower occupational status, 
although those with lower status often report experiencing more anger at work (Lively 2000; 
Sloan 2004).1  
                                                      
1 There is evidence that anger expression differs by social group, and also that people use the emotion 
expressed in a reaction to a trying or frustrating situation as a cue to an actor’s social status. A higher 
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These results correspond with those showing a better fit between emotion and behavior (or less 
inhibited behavior) in high-status individuals, whether that higher status occurs naturally or has 
been experimentally produced (Anderson & Berdahl 2002; Hecht & LaFrance 1988; Keltner et 
al. 2003). One study (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee 2003) artificially varied the status of 
subjects within their experimental groups, and found that participants of greater status were 
quicker to stop an irritating noise than those of lesser status. The proneness of high-status 
individuals to act in accordance with their emotions or wishes may also be reflected in more 
insistent driving techniques. For example, Taubman-Ben-Ari et al. (2004) found that placing 
high value on a driving style that reflected behaviors such as honking and flashing high beams 
at other drivers (“angry driving”) was positively associated with higher scores on Burger and 
Cooper’s (1979) Desirability for Control scale. In other words, those who agreed with 
statements such as “I would prefer to be a leader than a follower” and disagreed with statements 
such as “Others usually know what is best for me” also reported more honking and light-
flashing behavior while driving. 
 
There is, however, reason to believe that the relevant determinant of the expression of anger or 
irritation is less the status of the angered person than the difference in status between the 
angered person and the person who angered him or her. Some empirical evidence indicates that 
aggression “flows downward” in the status chain. For instance, subjects in Kuppens, Van 
Mechelen and Meulders’ (2004) experiment reported being more likely to express anger toward 
a target of lower relative status than toward one of higher relative status, a result also obtained 
by Allan and Gilbert (2002). Using a probability sample of the U.S. population, Sloan (2004) 
found that workers were more likely to express anger toward their subordinates than toward 
                                                                                                                                                              
status is ascribed to the person with the angry reaction (Conway, DiFazio, & Mayman 1999: Study 2; 
Tiedens 2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita 2000). 
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their supervisors. Such results are also consistent with evidence from various animal studies on 
the establishment and maintenance of social hierarchies, in which aggression is found to flow 
downward (Barroso, Alados, & Boza 2000). 
 
Alternatively, sanctioning behavior in road traffic may reflect a more general phenomenon of 
lower intra-group aggression or higher inter-group aggression. One mechanism for such an 
effect is a greater willingness to cooperate and a reduced propensity to aggress against actors 
whom one perceives as belonging to the same group. Research on social categorization and 
inter-group behavior (Billig & Tajfel 1973; Brewer & Kramer 1985; Mummendey & Schreiber 
1983; Robinson 1996; Tajfel 1982a, 1978, 1982b; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament 1971; 
Turner, Brown, & Tajfel 1979) has revealed a strong bias toward favoring the in-group in many 
contexts – importantly, even “… in the absence of comparison with any other groups” (Brewer 
1979:321; also see Kramer & Brewer 1986). In-group favoritism implies that aggression “flows 
outward.” 
 
There are also arguments for the reverse effect: that is, that aggression “flows inward.” Gould 
(2003) argues that conflict occurs less often in relationships in which there is a clear hierarchy 
than in “symmetrical relationships”. The reason is that people have a strong tendency to battle 
out a ranking if their positions are ambiguous due to the lack of an established hierarchy. 
 
Whichever of this hypotheses applies, if the punishing behavior can be predicted from the 
difference in status between two parties to a conflict, previous studies on horn-honking 
responses have examined only one half of the equation. Some, such as the study conducted by 
Doob and Gross (1968), found that low-status blocking cars elicited faster reactions and thus 
higher levels of sanctioning than high-status blocking cars. Studies such as the one from 
Diekmann et al. (1996) report that high-status drivers reacted more quickly to having their 
progress impeded than low-status drivers. In the current study, we investigate a possible 
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interaction effect between the status of the blocker and the status of the frustrated driver. We 
assume that the disparity between the statuses of the actors (rather than the status of one or the 
other per se) determines the aggressiveness displayed in the blocked-intersection situation.  
 
With respect to the various hypotheses about how the status differences matter, we conjecture 
that all of them might be true, but that they apply to different situations. For example, in a 
setting where there is competition for hierarchical positions, one could assume with Gould 
(2003) that most aggression occurs among actors with ambiguous positions. Likewise, in a 
situation in which lower status actors depend on higher ranking actors, such as in a workplace 
setting where the latter can exercise power over the former, aggression may “flow downward.” 
Conversely, the underdogs may rebel against the oppressors, if given a chance to do so: that is, 
if the situation is such that they do not have to fear further repression. In this case, aggression 
would “flows upward.” In the situation of blocked vehicles under study, however, we believe 
that the status indicated by the cars of the two drivers mostly functions as a device for social 
categorization, giving rise to the mechanisms of in-group favoritism. Hence, we assume that 
sanctioning behavior “flows outward”: that is, sanctioning behavior is expressed more readily if 
the status between the two actors is different, independent of the direction of the difference. 
Note, however, that the same pattern could also result if, for example, higher status drivers 
punish lower status drivers because they feel more entitled to use the road, and, at the same 
time, the “underdogs” take the chance to rebel because they can do so without fearing 
retaliation.  
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2. Methods 
 
Experiment 1 
 
We blocked cars at traffic lights using an experimental car and measured horn-honking response 
times in a similar manner to Doob and Gross (1968). A pre-test was conducted to practice the 
blocking method and test our ability to capture the relevant information on our experimental 
subjects validly and reliably. Our experiment was conducted on two consecutive Saturday 
mornings in spring 1995 at an intersection with relatively light traffic in Bern, Switzerland. On 
the first Saturday we used an experimental car indicating a high social status (a black 1995 Audi 
A6 2.6L), and on the second a car indicating a low social status (a blue 1989 Volkswagen Golf 
C1 Mark III). Traffic conditions were similar on both mornings. As in other studies, the use of 
this method reflects the presumption that the car driven by a subject is (to some degree) 
assumed by the drivers of other cars to reflect his or her social status (Marsh & Collett 1986 
provide evidence that this is the case). It also assumes that other subjects are able to perceive 
information such as the make of an automobile, which seems reasonable since drivers appear to 
note a wide variety of information about other drivers spontaneously (Knapper & Cropley 
1980).  
 
An experimental trial was initiated only when the experimental car could be stopped as the first 
car in a line formed at a red light, and when it was followed by just one car, whose driver’s 
behavior was being recorded.2 After the light turned green, the experimental car remained 
stopped until the driver in the car behind it honked. The experimental car contained a driver and 
two visible observers, all male. One of the observers measured the time between the light’s 
                                                      
2 All trials were conducted at the same intersection between a main street and a side street. The trials were 
conducted in the side street, alternating the direction between each trial. 
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changing and the honking response. Using the mirrors, the other observer noted some 
information about the blocked subject, including the sex and estimated age of the driver, as well 
as the make, model, and status indicated by the blocked vehicle (in terms of one of three 
hierarchical categories based on the car’s make, model, and approximate age). If a blocked 
subject did not respond within the twelve-second period during which the light was green, the 
case was considered censored at t = 12. In total, 123 valid cases were observed, approximately 
60 on each of the mornings, of which 26 represented censored measurements.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
In the second experiment, we blocked cars in a one-way street with relatively light traffic in the 
inner city of Zurich. We placed the experimental car approximately 30 meters down the road 
from the entry into the street, positioned slightly diagonally so that approaching vehicles could 
not pass and that the diver of the blocking car could be seen. After conducting several pretests, 
our experiment was carried out on a sunny Tuesday, between 10:30 a.m. and 5:40 p.m., in 
summer 2005. We used two experimental cars, one indicating high social status (a dark silver 
2005 BMW 530i limousine; selling price 64,000 CHF) and one indicating low social status (a 
silver 1995 VW Golf 1800 Rolling Stones; selling price 24,000 CHF). Cars were switched 
about every 20 trials. We also varied the sex of the driver in the blocking car, switching drivers 
about every 10 trials. Since traffic conditions and temperature changed during the day, we 
control for temperature and traffic density in the analyses below.3  
                                                      
3 Temperature data for Zurich (one measurement every 10 minutes) was obtained from MeteoSwiss 
(Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology). Information on hourly traffic flow (number of vehicles 
counted by the traffic sensors in Zurich) was obtained from ASTRA (Federal Roads Office). We used 
linear interpolation between measurements to match temperature and traffic density to the individual 
trials. 
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An experimental trial was initiated when a vehicle entered the street after the experimental car 
was in position. The experimental car remained stopped until the blocked car (or one of the 
subsequent cars, if several vehicles entered the street) honked. Each trail was taped by two 
video cameras, one hidden below a piece of clothing in the back of the experimental car and one 
operated by a confederate hiding in a hedge on the side of the street. Two further confederates, 
one on each side of the street, took notes about the blocked car, its driver, and the horn honking 
reaction using standardized forms (including information such as the time until the horn was 
honked, the number of blocked vehicles, the sex and estimated age of the driver, and the status 
indicated by the foremost blocked vehicle). All collected information was validated and 
complemented based on an analysis of the videos later on. For example, exact measurements of 
the horn-honking response times were obtained from the videos (in a few cases, the honking 
was not audible on the video, in which case we used the measurement taken in the field; the 
correlation between the measurements taken in the field and the videos is r = 0.98). Based on 
stills from the videos, an automobile expert coded the exact make and model of the blocked car, 
its approximate production year, and its selling price. 
 
In the analyses below we exclude a handful of observations because, for example, the 
approaching car turned into a parking spot instead of being blocked, or because information on 
some key variables was missing or inconsistent (due to the failure of the observers to take notes, 
or due to missing video recordings). We also exclude 10 observations because the blocked 
vehicle was a delivery van or motorcycle, for which a status comparison to the experimental car 
is difficult. In total, 106 valid cases are available for the analysis. In 10 cases, the honking 
response came from a successive vehicle instead of the foremost blocked car (detailed data was 
collected only for the foremost car). We treat these cases as censored in our analysis. 
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We use two measures for the status of the blocked vehicles: (a) a subjective classification in 
terms of one of three hierarchical categories similar to Experiment 1 (lower, middle, higher), 
and (b) the estimated monetary value of the vehicle. The monetary value is equal to the selling 
price after applying a yearly depreciation of 5%. There is a clear relation between the two 
measures: the average monetary values are 16,497 CHF, 24,971 CHF, or 37,573 CHF for 
vehicles classified as lower, middle, or higher status. 
 
Data analysis 
 
Since there are censored response times, the techniques of event history modeling are the most 
appropriate statistical tools for analyzing the data (Diekmann et al. 1996:763). We use the 
product-limit method to estimate survival curves as descriptive measures. Multivariate analysis 
employs the semi-parametric Cox regression model (Cox 1972; Diekmann & Mitter 1984). In 
the Cox model, the hazard rate r(t) of horn-honking (i.e. the probability of a horn-honking event 
at time t, conditional on its not having yet occurred) is modeled as the product of an unspecified 
baseline hazard rate and the exponent of a linear function of the covariates. In the following 
analysis we will report the exponents of the estimated coefficients, since they can be interpreted 
in a straightforward manner as multiplication effects on the hazard rate, i.e. as hazard ratios 
(effects greater than one imply an increase in the hazard rate and faster honking reactions; 
effects lower than one imply a decrease in the hazard rate and slower honking reactions). The 
Cox regression assumes proportional hazards at each point in time. The applicability of this 
assumption was tested, and deviation from it was negligible for the models discussed below (see 
last row in Table 1). 
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3. Results 
 
Figure 1 shows the horn-honking survival functions from the two experiments. In Experiment 1, 
the time-window in which a honking reaction could occur was restricted to 12 seconds. About 
80 percent of all blocked drivers honked within these 12 seconds (i.e. the survival function 
drops down to about 20%). In Experiment 2, there was no such restriction, as the blocking car 
remained stopped until the first honking reaction occurred (the maximum time recoded in our 
data is 60 seconds). In Figure 1, we only display the survival curve for the first 20 seconds, 
within which about 80% of the blocked subjects honked. Overall, honking reactions occurred 
faster in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. The reason is that in Experiment 2, reaction time 
was measured from when the blocked vehicle entered the street, whereas in Experiment 1, time 
was measured from the moment the lights turned green, with the blocked vehicle already in 
position behind the experimental car. 
 
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
seconds
 
Figure 1: Horn-honking survival functions 
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To test our hypothesis that honking reactions are affected by the status difference between the 
experimental car and the blocked vehicle, Table 1 displays the results of several Cox regressions 
(for descriptive statistics, see Table 2 in the Appendix). In Model 1, which is based on the data 
of Experiment 1, we see that a status difference between the two vehicles accords with a 
significant increase in the hazard rate of honking: a one-point status difference increases the 
hazard rate by about 40%. The corresponding results from Experiment 2 (Model 3) are very 
similar (showing a significant increase in the hazard rate of about 45% for a one-point status 
difference).4 Furthermore, if the status difference is measured in terms of the difference in 
monetary value between the vehicles, we see a very clear and statistically significant effect 
(Model 5). Since we use a logarithmic specification, the coefficient of 2.40 can be interpreted as 
about a 2.40 · ln(2) = 66% increase in the hazard rate if the higher status vehicle is worth about 
twice as much as the lower status vehicle, compared to a situation in which the value of both 
vehicles is the same.  
 
                                                      
4 The status difference variable in these models can take on three values: 0 (same status category), 1 
(difference between a middle status reactor and a lower or higher status experimental car), and 2 
(difference between a higher status reactor and a lower status experimental car, or vice versa). Since the 
null hypothesis of a linear effect of the status difference (i.e., the effect of a one-point status difference is 
exactly half of the effect of a two-point status difference) cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.893 for Model 
1 and 0.601 for Model 3), we refrain from using a more complex specification with separate effects for 
the two levels of status difference. 
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Table 1: Multivariate analysis of honking response times (z-values in brackets) 
 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 Status Status Value 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Absolute difference in 
status or valuea 
1.42* 
(2.16) 
 
 
1.45* 
(2.44) 
 
 
2.40** 
(3.07) 
 
 
Downward difference in 
status or valuea 
 
 
1.11 
(0.46) 
 
 
1.07 
(0.34) 
 
 
2.99* 
(2.50) 
Upward difference in status 
or valuea 
 
 
1.90* 
(2.57) 
 
 
2.02** 
(3.17) 
 
 
2.11* 
(2.16) 
Status of experimental car 
(0 low, 1 high) 
1.15 
(0.67) 
0.67 
(-0.99) 
0.85 
(-0.71) 
0.46* 
(-2.08) 
0.52* 
(-2.23) 
0.66 
(-0.88) 
Driver in experimental car 
is female (0/1) 
 
 
 
 
0.52** 
(-2.81) 
0.53** 
(-2.69) 
0.51** 
(-2.84) 
0.50** 
(-2.91) 
Driver in blocked car is 
female (0/1) 
0.64 
(-1.64) 
0.55* 
(-2.08) 
1.61+ 
(1.95) 
1.50+ 
(1.66) 
1.50+ 
(1.67) 
1.50+ 
(1.68) 
Blocked driver aged 18 thru 
30 (0/1) 
1.45 
(1.27) 
1.33 
(0.97) 
0.48* 
(-2.42) 
0.47* 
(-2.47) 
0.47* 
(-2.41) 
0.47* 
(-2.40) 
Blocked driver aged 56 or 
older (0/1) 
1.72* 
(2.07) 
1.78* 
(2.18) 
1.46 
(1.12) 
1.44 
(1.07) 
1.27 
(0.72) 
1.31 
(0.80) 
Business vehicle (0/1)  
 
 
 
2.38* 
(2.01) 
2.05 
(1.64) 
2.28+ 
(1.94) 
2.37* 
(2.00) 
Temperature  
 
 
 
1.13 
(0.75) 
1.24 
(1.25) 
1.18 
(0.99) 
1.16 
(0.91) 
Traffic density  
 
 
 
1.09 
(1.05) 
1.12 
(1.37) 
1.10 
(1.16) 
1.10 
(1.17) 
Direction of entry into road 
(0 left, 1 right) 
 
 
 
 
2.10** 
(2.65) 
2.14** 
(2.72) 
2.15** 
(2.74) 
2.14** 
(2.73) 
Number of trials (events) 123(97) 123(97) 106(96) 106(96) 106(96) 106(96) 
Likelihood ratio χ2 (df) 13.5(5)* 16.0(6)* 26.4(10)** 31.0(11)** 29.8(10)*** 30.2(11)** 
Proportional-hazards test 
(p-value) 
0.784 0.800 0.414 0.476 0.640 0.728 
Notes: Displayed are hazard ratios from proportional-hazards models (Cox regressions). Reference age 
group: drivers aged 31 through 55. 
a Difference in status (0: same level, 1: low or high vs. middle, 2: low vs. high) (models 1–4) or 
difference in log value (models 5/6) between blocked vehicle and blocking vehicle. The difference is 
downward (upward) if the status/value of the blocked vehicle is higher (lower) than the status/value of the 
blocking vehicle. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Overall, these results provide clear evidence for the “difference hypothesis” (the hypothesis that 
sanctioning is exerted more readily if there is a status difference between the two actors). Also 
note that the above models fit the data significantly better than models in which the status or 
monetary value of the blocked vehicle is introduced as is, without taking differences to the 
status of the experimental car (not shown). To put it another way, the actors’ status levels per se 
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do not explain the patterns found in our data; it is the combination of status between the two 
actors that matters. 
 
Against the backdrop of the literature discussed above, an interesting question is whether the 
effects work the same in both directions, or whether, for example, aggression mainly “flows 
downward”. In Models 2, 4, and 6, the effects of the status difference are separated into an 
effect of a downward difference (the blocked driver has a higher status than the blocker) and an 
effect of an upward difference (the blocked driver has a lower status than the blocker). The 
results from Model 2 (Experiment 1) and Model 4 (Experiment 2) suggest that status matters 
when a lower status car is blocked by a higher status car, but not in the reverse case. These 
results suggest that aggression “flows upward”, but the results are not fully conclusive, as the 
difference in effects of a downward difference and an upward difference is not statistically 
significant in Model 2 (p = 0.119) and only mildly significant in Model 4 (p = 0.034). It is thus 
not entirely clear whether the distinction between downward and upward differences really 
matters. Furthermore, Model 6, in which status is measured in terms of the monetary value of 
the vehicles, does not provide support for such a distinction. Here, both effects are statistically 
significant, and the effect of a downward difference is in fact somewhat stronger (although the 
difference between the two effects is far from being statistically significant: p = 0.515). The 
results from Model 6 thus suggest that the relationship between peer-punishment and status is 
similar in both situations.  
 
For a better impression of the size of the discussed effects, Figure 2 displays the predicted 
survival curves from Models 2, 4, and 6 for different combinations of the status of the 
experimental vehicle and the status of the blocked driver (with average values for the control 
variables). In the case of Model 2 (upper subgraphs) and Model 4 (middle subgraphs), the 
scenarios reflect the possible combinations of the categorical status variable (small difference: 
same category; medium difference: middle vs. low or high; large difference: low vs. high). In 
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the case of Model 6 (lower subgraphs), the scenarios are determined by relative differences in 
monetary value (small difference: same value; medium difference: the value of one of the 
vehicles is 50% higher than the value of the other vehicle; large difference: one of the vehicles 
is worth twice as much as the other; these scenarios were chosen in accordance with the 
approximate differences in average vehicle values between the three status groups, for which 
see above). The subgraphs on the left illustrate the effect of a (downward) status difference in 
case of the lower status experimental car; the subgraphs on the right show the effect of an 
(upward) status difference in case of the upper status experimental car. In all cases larger status 
differences lead to lower survival curves: the larger the status difference, the more drivers honk 
their horn within a given timespan. In the upper two subgraphs on the left, the differences 
between the curves are negligible (and not statistically significant). In the other cases, however, 
the differences are substantial. For example, in Experiment 2, only about 20% honk within the 
first 10 seconds when both vehicles belong to the higher status class, but more than 60% of 
lower class drivers honk in the same timespan if they are blocked by a higher class vehicle 
(middle subgraph on the right). Correspondingly, the median response time (the time until 50% 
of the cars honked) is almost 20 seconds in the former case, but only 8 seconds in the later. For 
Experiment 1, the effects of an upward status difference are of similar magnitude (see the upper 
right subgraph). If status is measured in terms of vehicle value, the effects are substantial in both 
directions (see lower subgraphs), but the magnitude of the effects is somewhat smaller than 
above. Median response times for large and small differences were about 10 and 15 seconds in 
the case of the low status blocker, and about 14 and 20 seconds in the case of the high status 
blocker. 
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Figure 2: Predicted survival functions by status or value difference from Models 2, 4, and 6 
 
Note that the curves in the right subgraphs tend to be higher than the curves in the left 
subgraphs. This means that, controlling for status difference, an upper status experimental car 
elicited a somewhat slower honking responses than a lower status car. The corresponding 
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coefficients (reflecting the difference between the solid lines on the left and on the right) point 
in the same direction in all three models, but only in Model 4 is the coefficient statistically 
significant. The evidence for a more generous treatment of high-status norm violators is 
therefore only weak. 
 
With respect to the control variables, we find a clear effect of the sex of the driver of the 
experimental car. Hazard rates were substantially lower if the driver was female and not male 
(Models 4–6, Experiment 2 only; in Experiment 1 the driver was always male). With respect to 
the sex of the blocked driver, we found inconsistent results between the two experiments. In 
Experiment 1, females tended to have lower hazard rates than males, but in Experiment 2, 
females tended to show faster honking reactions (the effects, however, were only marginally 
significant).5 One may suspect that the combination of the genders of the two drivers matters. 
Adding an interaction term to the models of Experiment 2 did reveal a diminishing effect if both 
drivers were female, but the difference was far from being statistically significant (p-values 
                                                      
5 Results from other studies on the relative willingness of males and females to sound their car horns are 
also ambiguous. While Doob and Gross (1968), Shinar (1998:149–150) and Shinar and Compton (2004) 
report significantly fewer honking responses by female drivers, the effect has not been significant in 
several replications of the horn-honking experiment (Chase & Mills 1973; Deaux 1971; Diekmann et al. 
1996; Ellison et al. 1995; Forgas 1976; Kenrick & MacFarlane 1986; Shinar 1998:151–156; Turner et al. 
1975), although the results of most of these studies showed longer latencies for women. Hennessey and 
Wiesenthal (1999) find no differences between men and women in behaviors such as honking, but 
suggest in a later article (2001) that a more distinct difference between men and women may be expected 
in the case of “driver violence”, i.e. more severe forms of behavior, such as chasing other drivers or 
vandalizing vehicles. These results fit well with those reported for aggression in general. A meta-analysis 
by Bettencourt and Miller (1996) suggests that the largest differences between male and female 
aggression occur either in conditions in which there is no provocation, or when the aggression is 
expressed in physical form. 
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between 0.3 and 0.4, depending on the model). In terms of the age of the blocked drivers, the 
results were also inconsistent between the experiments. Whereas older drivers in Experiment 1 
had significantly higher hazard rates than middle-aged drivers, the corresponding effect was 
smaller and not significant in Experiment 2 (although pointing in the same direction). 
Furthermore, young drivers in Experiment 1 tended to have higher hazard rates (although this 
was not statistically significant), whereas younger drivers in Experiment 2 had significantly 
lower hazard rates than middle-aged drivers. For Experiment 2, also, for which more control 
variables are available, we found mild evidence for faster honking reactions in drivers of 
business vehicles. Temperature and traffic density had effects in the expected direction, but 
were not statistically significant. A clear effect, however, was found for the direction from 
which the blocked car entered the street. This is a purely technical effect related to the way in 
which we determined the starting point for measuring the honking response times. We also 
evaluated the effects of some further control variables, such as the color of the blocked car, 
without finding any meaningful results (not shown).6 
 
                                                      
6 One variable, whether successive vehicles were present behind the blocked car, did have a significant 
effect (and including this variable also rendered the effect of traffic density significant). One could expect 
that the presence of successive vehicles is an additional stressor putting pressure on the blocked car, 
leading to faster honking reactions. Oddly, however, the effect was negative. We did not include this 
effect in our models because the result is an artifact of how the variable was measured. The longer a 
blocked driver refrained from honking, the higher the chance that additional vehicles appeared in the 
street (this also explains the increased effect of traffic density, as more cars appear in a given timespan if 
traffic density is high). Because the variable only measures whether additional vehicles were present, but 
not the exact times at which they appeared, the variable is endogenous to the honking behavior of the 
blocked driver. To estimate the effect of additional vehicles consistently, their appearance would have to 
be introduced in terms of a time-varying covariate. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The findings reported in this paper provide evidence that the disparity in social status between 
two actors has a positive effect on the degree of sanctioning behavior that is expressed during 
their interaction. These results were obtained in two road-traffic field experiments, during which 
subjects’ behavior was observed after their cars had been blocked by another car. Specifically, 
latencies in horn-honking responses were significantly higher in cases where the driver of a car 
was blocked by an experimental car of similar status than in cases where it was blocked by a car 
of quite different status. These results support our hypothesis. For the question of whether status 
differences operate in the same way irrespective of the direction of the difference (the 
punisher’s status being higher than the norm violator’s status, or vice versa), or whether 
sanctioning “flows downward” as suggested by literature on aggressive behavior, our findings 
are ambiguous. The results for one of our status measures suggests that sanctioning mainly 
“flows upward,” counter to the expectation from the literature. However, the statistical evidence 
for a difference in the effect depending on direction is not particularly strong. Moreover, clearly 
symmetric effects were found for our second status measure.  
 
Despite the fact that our results were obtained with a few deviations from previous experimental 
designs, they may reflect something more than the choice of a particular methodology, 
especially since similar results were obtained by Diekmann et al. (1996). The experimental car 
used to block the intersection by Diekmann et al. was classified as “lower middle class”, which 
was also the class of blocked drivers who showed the lowest level of horn-honking in their 
experiment. The level of horn-honking increased monotonically for higher status classes, and 
also for the lower status class: that is, the larger the status difference, the higher the level of 
horn-honking. Whether similar social status may have contributed to the effects detailed in other 
previous studies is difficult to assess, since the status of the blocked car was not reported in 
those studies. However, according to the status-similarity hypothesis, the results of the classic 
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horn-honking experiments described in the introduction should depend on the composition of 
the sample of blocked subjects. If there are, for example, predominantly high-status subjects in 
the sample, one would expect a lower-status blocking vehicle to elicit more aggressive 
responses than a higher-status car, as observed by Doob and Gross (1968) and Deaux (1971). If, 
on the other hand, the reactors are drivers of mostly low-status cars, one would expect more 
aggressive responses toward a higher-status blocking vehicle than to a lower-status blocking 
vehicle, as reported by Chase and Mills (1973).  
 
The situation we study can be seen as a social dilemma in the sense that individual behavior 
(blocking the road) has negative externalities for the public (impediment of traffic flow), and 
that the blocking car violates a social norm (to keep the road clear if possible). Most likely, 
however, there is no second-order dilemma with respect to the enforcement of norm 
compliance, as most of the externalities are imposed on a single actor (the blocked driver). It is 
reasonable to assume that the costs of sanctioning are much lower than the benefits, even though 
there may be a small chance that the norm violator will engage in retaliatory behavior rather 
than move the car. Nonetheless, our study is a valuable contribution to the literature on peer-
punishment, as it shows how punishing behavior depends on the social status of the actors. We 
are, however, skeptical about whether our results can be applied to situations in which status is 
more than a mere token of social categorization. As discussed in the introduction, different 
results may, for example, be expected in a situation characterized by competition for status 
positions, or in a situation where an explicit power relationship exists between actors of 
different status. How status relates to sanctioning in different types of situations is an interesting 
question to be studied in future research.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the predictors 
 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Status of blocker (0 low, 1 high) 0.496  0.481  
Driver in blocking car is female (0/1)   0.528  
Status of blocked vehicle     
– low 0.252  0.368  
– middle 0.553  0.387  
– high 0.195  0.245  
Absolute difference in status (0–2) 0.976 0.671 0.972 0.786 
Downward difference in status (0–2) 0.463 0.669 0.443 0.705 
Upward difference in status (0–2) 0.512 0.694 0.528 0.771 
Natural logarithm of value of blocked vehicle 
(selling price minus 5% depreciation per year)  
  10.02 0.451 
Absolute difference in log value   0.792 0.497 
Downward difference in log value   0.259 0.363 
Upward difference in log value   0.533 0.627 
Female blocked driver (0/1) 0.236  0.349  
Estimated age of blocked driver     
– 18 through 30 0.138  0.406  
– 31 through 55 0.650  0.462  
– 56 or older 0.211  0.132  
Business vehicle (0/1)   0.075  
Temperature (in degree Celsius)   28.19 0.984 
Traffic density (in 1000 vehicles per hour)   11.64 2.214 
Direction of entry into road (0 left, 1 right)   0.764  
Number of observations 123  106  
 
 
 22 
References 
Allan, Steven, and Paul Gilbert. 2002. “Anger and anger expression in relation to perceptions of 
social rank, entrapment and depressive symptoms.” Personality and Individual 
Differences 32(3):551–565. 
Anderson, Cameron, and Jennifer L. Berdahl. 2002. “The experience of power: Examining the 
effects of power on approach and inhibition tendencies.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 83(6):1362–1377. 
Anderson, Craig A., and Brad J. Bushman. 2002. “Human aggression.” Annual Review of 
Psychology 53:27–51. 
Baron, Robert A. 1976. “The reduction of human aggression: A field study of the influence of 
incompatible reactions.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 6(3):260–274. 
Barroso, F. G., C. L. Alados, and J. Boza. 2000. “Social hierarchy in the domestic goat: effect 
on food habits and production.” Applied Animal Behaviour Science 69(1):35–53. 
Bettencourt, B. Ann, and Norman Miller. 1996. “Gender differences in aggression as a function 
of provocation: A meta-analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 119(3):422–447. 
Billig, Michael, and Henri Tajfel. 1973. “Social categorization and similarity in intergroup 
behaviour.” European Journal of Social Psychology 3(1):9–26. 
Brewer, Marilynn B. 1979. “In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-
motivational analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 86(2):307–324. 
Brewer, Marilynn B., and Roderick M. Kramer. 1985. “The psychology of intergroup attitudes 
and behavior.” Annual Review of Psychology 36:219–243. 
Burger, Jerry M., and Harris M. Cooper. 1979. “The desirability of control.” Motivation and 
Emotion 3(4):381–393. 
Chase, Lawrence J., and Norbert H. Mills. 1973. “Status of frustrator as a facilitator of 
aggression: A brief note.” The Journal of Psychology 84(2):225–226. 
Clark, Candace. 1990. “Emotions and micropolitics in everyday life: Some patterns and 
paradoxes of ‘place’.” Pp. 505–533 in Research agendas in the sociology of emotions, 
edited by T. D. Kemper. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Conway, Michael R., Roberto DiFazio, and Shari Mayman. 1999. “Judging others’ emotions as 
a function of others’ status.” Social Psychology Quarterly 62(3):291–305. 
Cox, David R. 1972. “Regression models and life-tables.” Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Series B 34:187–220. 
Deaux, Kay K. 1971. “Honking at the intersection: A replication and extension.” The Journal of 
Social Psychology 84(1):159–160. 
Deffenbacher, Jerry L., Rebekah S. Lynch, Eugene R. Oetting, and David A. Yingling. 2001. 
“Driving anger: correlates and a test of state-trait theory.” Personality and Individual 
Differences 31(8):1321–1331. 
Deffenbacher, Jerry L., Eugene R. Oetting, and Rebekah S. Lynch. 1994. “Development of a 
driving anger scale.” Psychological Reports 74(1):83–91. 
Diekmann, Andreas, Monika Jungbauer-Gans, Heinz Krassnig, and Sigrid Lorenz. 1996. 
“Social status and aggression: A field study analyzed by survival analysis.” Journal of 
Social Psychology 136(6):761–768. 
Diekmann, Andreas, and Peter Mitter. 1984. Methoden zur Analyse von Zeitverläufen. 
Anwendungen stochastischer Prozesse bei der Untersuchung von Ereignisdaten. 
Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner. 
Doob, Anthony N., and Alan E. Gross. 1968. “Status of frustrator as an inhibitor of horn-
honking responses.” The Journal of Social Psychology 76(2):213–218. 
Ellison, Patricia A., John M. Govern, Herbert L. Petri, and Michael H. Figler. 1995. 
“Anonymity and aggressive driving behavior: A field study.” Journal of Social Behavior 
and Personality 10(1):265–272. 
Forgas, Joseph P. 1976. “An unobtrusive study of reactions to national stereotypes in four 
European countries.” The Journal of Social Psychology 99(1):37–42. 
 23 
Gould, Roger V. 2003. Collision of Wills: How ambiguity about social rank breeds conflict. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Galinsky, Adam D., Deborah H. Gruenfeld, and Joe C. Magee. 2003. “From power to action.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85(3):453–466. 
Haukkala, Ari. 2002. “Socio-economic differences in hostility measures: A population based 
study.” Psychology and Health 17(2):191–202. 
Hecht, Marvin A., and Marianne LaFrance. 1988. “License or obligation to smile: The effect of 
power and gender on amount and type of smiling.” Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 24(12):1326–1336. 
Hennessy, Dwight A., and David L. Wiesenthal. 1997. “The relationship between traffic 
congestion, driver stress and direct versus indirect coping behaviours.” Ergonomics 
40(3):348–361. 
Hennessy, Dwight A., and David L. Wiesenthal. 1999. “Traffic congestion, driver stress, and 
driver aggression.” Aggressive Behavior 25(6):409–423. 
Hennessy, Dwight A., and David L. Wiesenthal. 2001. “Gender, driver aggression, and driver 
violence: An applied evaluation.” Sex Roles 44(11–12):661–676. 
Jann, Ben, Stephan Suhner, and Renato Marioni. 1995. Sozialer Status und “Hupzeiten”. 
Ergebnisse aus einem Feldexperiment. University of Bern: Mimeo. 
Jann, Ben. 2009. “Sozialer Status und Hup-Verhalten. Ein Feldexperiment zum Zusam- 
menhang zwischen Status und Aggression im Strassenverkehr.” Pp. 397–410 in Klein 
aber fein! Quantitative empirische Sozialforschung mit kleinen Fallzahlen, edited by P. 
Kriwy, and C. Gross. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag. 
Keltner, Dacher, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, and Cameron Anderson. 2003. “Power, approach, and 
inhibition.” Psychological Review 110(2):265–284. 
Kemper, Theodore D. 1978. A social interaction theory of emotions. New York: Wiley. 
Kemper, Theodore D. 1987. “How many emotions are there? Wedding the social and the 
autonomic components.” American Journal of Sociology 93(2):263–289. 
Kenrick, Douglas T., and Steven W. MacFarlane. 1986. “Ambient temperature and horn 
honking: A field study of the heat/aggression relationship.” Environment and Behavior 
18(2):179–191. 
Knapper, Christopher K., and Arthur J. Cropley. 1980. “Interpersonal factors in driving.” 
International Review of Applied Psychology 29(4):415–438. 
Kramer, Roderick M., and Marilynn B. Brewer. 1986. “Social group identity and the emergence 
of cooperation in resource conservation dilemmas.” Pp. 205–234 in Experimental social 
dilemmas, edited by H. A. M. Wilke, D. M. Messick, and C. G. Rutte. Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang. 
Kuppens, Peter, Iven Van Mechelen, and Michel Meulders. 2004. “Every cloud has a silver 
lining: Interpersonal and individual differences determinants of anger-related behaviors.” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30(12):1550–1564. 
Lajunen, Timo, and Dianne Parker. 2001. “Are aggressive people aggressive drivers? A study of 
the relationship between self-reported general aggressiveness, driver anger and aggressive 
driving.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 33(2):243–255. 
Lajunen, Timo, Dianne Parker, and Stephen G. Stradling. 1998. “Dimensions of driver anger, 
aggressive and highway code violations and their mediation by safety orientation in UK 
drivers.” Transportation Research Part F 1:107–121. 
Lawton, Rebecca, and Amanda Nutter. 2002. “A comparison of reported levels and expression 
of anger in everyday and driving situations.” British Journal of Psychology 93(3):407–
423. 
Lively, Kathryn J. 2000. “Reciprocal emotion management: Working together to maintain 
stratification.” Work and Occupations 27(1):32–63. 
Lovaglia, Michael J., and Jeffrey A. Houser. 1996. “Emotional reactions and status in groups.” 
American Sociological Review 61(5):869–883. 
 24 
Marsh, Peter, and Peter Collett. 1986. Driving passion: The psychology of the car. London: 
Jonathan Cape. 
McGarva, Andrew R., and Michelle Steiner. 2000. “Provoked driver aggression and status: A 
field study.” Transportation Research Part F 3:167–179. 
McKinnon, Neil J. 1994. Symbolic interactionism as affect control. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press. 
Mummendey, Amélle, and Hans-Joachim Schreiber. 1983. “Better or just different? Positive 
social identity by discrimination against, or by differentiation from outgroups.” European 
Journal of Social Psychology 13(4):389–397. 
Novaco, Raymond W. 1991. “Aggression on Roadways.” Pp. 253–326 in Targets of Violence 
and Aggression, edited by R. Baenninger. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers. 
Parker, Dianne, Timo Lajunen, and Heikki Summala. 2002. “Anger and aggression among 
drivers in three European countries.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 34(2):229–235. 
Pitkänen, Lea. 1973. “An aggression machine: II. Interindividual differences in the aggressive 
defence responses aroused by varying stimulus conditions.” Scandinavian Journal of 
Psychology 14(2):65–74. 
Ramirez, J. Martin, Carmen Santisteban, Takehiro Fujihara, and Stephanie Van Goozen. 2002. 
“Differences between experience of anger and readiness to angry action: A study of 
Japanese and Spanish students.” Aggressive Behavior 28(6):429–438. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia, and Cathryn Johnson. 1990. “What is the relationship between 
socioemotional behavior and status in task groups?” American Journal of Sociology 
95(5):1189–1212. 
Robinson, W. Peter. 1996. Social groups and identities. Developing the legacy of Henri Tajfel. 
Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Rothe, Jörg, and Heiko Schmiedeskamp. 2006. Aggressionsverhalten im Strassenverkehr: 
Analyse der Hupverzögerung von blockierten Autos. ETH Zurich: Mimeo. 
Schieman, Scott. 2003. “Socioeconomic status and the frequency of anger across the life 
course.” Sociological Perspectives 46(2):207–222. 
Shinar, David. 1998. “Aggressive driving: The contribution of the drivers and the situation.” 
Transportation Research Part F 1:137–160. 
Shinar, David, and Richard Compton. 2004. “Aggressive driving: an observational study of 
driver, vehicle, and situational variables.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 36(3):429–
437. 
Sloan, Melissa M. 2004. “The effects of occupational characteristics on the experience and 
expression of anger in the workplace.” Work and Occupations 31(1):38–72. 
Smith-Lovin, Lynn. 1990. “Emotion as the confirmation and disconfirmation of identity: An 
affect control model.” Pp. 238–270 in Research agendas in the sociology of emotions, 
edited by T. D. Kemper. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Tajfel, Henri. 1978. Differentiation between social groups. Studies in the social psychology of 
intergroup relations. London: Academic Press. 
Tajfel, Henri. 1982a. “Social psychology of intergroup relations.” Annual Review of Psychology 
33:1–39. 
Tajfel, Henri. 1982b. Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tajfel, Henri, Michael G. Billig, R. P. Bundy, and Claude Flament. 1971. “Social 
Categorization and intergroup behaviour.” European Journal of Social Psychology 
1(2):149–177. 
Taubman-Ben-Ari, Orit, Mario Mikulincer, and Omri Gillath. 2004. “The multidimensional 
driving style inventory: Scale construction and validation.” Accident Analysis and 
Prevention 36:323–332. 
Tiedens, Larissa Z. 2001. “Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect 
of negative emotion expressions on social status conferral.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 80(1):86–94. 
 25 
Tiedens, Larissa Z., Phoebe C. Ellsworth, and Batja Mesquita. 2000. “Stereotypes about 
sentiments and status: Emotional expectations for high- and low-status group members.” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26(5):560–574. 
Turner, Charles W., John F. Layton, and Lynn S. Simons. 1975. “Naturalistic studies of 
aggressive behavior: Aggressive stimuli, victim visibility, and horn honking.” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 31(6):1098–1107. 
Turner, John C., Rupert J. Brown, and Henri Tajfel, 1979. “Social comparison and group 
interest in ingroup favouritism.” European Journal of Social Psychology 9(2):187–204. 
Verona, Edelyn, Christopher J. Patrick, and Alan R. Lang. 2002. “A direct assessment of the 
role of state and trait negative emotion in aggressive behavior.” Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology 111(2):249–258. 
Yagil, Dana. 2001. “Interpersonal antecedents of drivers’ aggression.” Transportation Research 
Part F 4:119–131. 
Yazawa, Hisashi. 2004. “Effects of inferred social status and a beginning driver’s sticker upon 
aggression of drivers in Japan.” Psychological Reports 94(3):1215–1220. 
 
 
